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We study an aggregation problem in which a society has to deter-
mine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions
of the members of the society on those issues. There is a pre-
scribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of
positions on the issues. The binary case of this problem, where
only two positions are allowed on each issue, is by now quite well
understood. We consider arbitrary sets of conceivable positions on
each issue. This general framework admits the modeling of aggre-
gation of various types of evaluations, including: assignments of
candidates to jobs, choice functions from sets of alternatives, judg-
ments in many-valued logic, probability estimates for events, etc.
We require that the aggregation be performed issue-by-issue, and
that the social position on each issue be supported by at least one
member of the society. The set of feasible evaluations is called an
impossibility domain if these requirements are satisﬁed for it only
by dictatorial aggregation; that is to say, if it gives rise to an ana-
logue of Arrow’s impossibility theorem for preference aggregation.
We obtain a two-part suﬃcient condition for an impossibility do-
main, and show that the major part is a necessary condition. For
the ternary case, where three positions are allowed on each issue,
we get a full characterization of impossibility domains.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
✩ Research supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant No. 779/08. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the
meetings: Workshop on Judgment Aggregation, Freudenstadt, September 2007; Theory of Logical Aggregation, Paris, July 2008;
The 3rd Israeli Game Theory Conference, Raanana, December 2008.
* Corresponding author. Fax: +972 4 8293388.
E-mail address: holzman@techunix.technion.ac.il (R. Holzman).0196-8858/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.aam.2010.02.005
488 E. Dokow, R. Holzman / Advances in Applied Mathematics 45 (2010) 487–5041. Introduction
There is, by now, a signiﬁcant body of literature on the problem of aggregating binary evaluations.
A society has to determine its position (yes/no) on each of several issues, based on the positions
of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set X of feasible evaluations,
i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues (X may be viewed as a subset of {0,1}m ,
where m is the number of issues). Examples include preference aggregation (where the issues are
pairwise comparisons and feasibility reﬂects rationality), and judgment aggregation (where the issues
are logical propositions and feasibility reﬂects consistency). Two properties of aggregators that are
suggested by the classical example of preference aggregation, may be stated in the general framework
as follows. An aggregator is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if the social position on any
given issue depends only on the individual positions on that same issue. An aggregator is Paretian
if the society adopts any unanimously held position. A natural question is under what conditions on
the set X of feasible evaluations, does the analogue of Arrow’s impossibility theorem hold: any IIA
and Paretian aggregator mapping proﬁles of evaluations in X to evaluations in X must be dictato-
rial (we call a set X for which this holds an impossibility domain). In [7] we gave a full answer:
X is an impossibility domain if and only if it is totally blocked and is not an aﬃne subspace of
{0,1}m .1
In the present paper, we extend the binary framework by allowing more than two positions on
each issue. Instead of {0,1}, we have an arbitrary set P of conceivable positions on each issue. The
prescribed set of feasible evaluations is now a subset X of Pm . We present a number of examples
that naturally ﬁt this framework.
Example A (Assignments). Suppose that there is a certain number m of available jobs, and a pool P of
candidates who can fulﬁll any of those jobs. The natural feasibility constraint is that no candidate can
be assigned to more than one job. This is reﬂected by the subset X of Pm consisting of all m-tuples
with pairwise distinct entries. Further constraints may apply, leading to smaller sets of feasible as-
signments. Considering an appointments committee in this situation, the question is how to aggregate
the feasible assignments suggested by the individual committee members into a feasible assignment
adopted by the committee.
Example B (Choice functions). We refer to a situation considered in classical social choice theory, where
P is a set of alternatives, and a family of m subsets P1, . . . , Pm of P is given (often this is the family
of all non-empty subsets of P , but in general a subset of P appears among the P j if it may become
the set of available alternatives). The choice function of a decision maker speciﬁes, for each P j , his
preferred element when facing a choice from P j . The set of all choice functions may be viewed as
the subset P1 × · · · × Pm of Pm . The set of feasible choice functions X is in general a subset of
P1 × · · · × Pm , reﬂecting constraints that one wishes to impose, for example rationalizability. The
question that we ask here is how to aggregate the feasible choice functions of the individual decision
makers into a feasible choice function for the society.
Example C (Truth values). Logic allows us to formulate propositions in a given language and to evaluate
their truth in a given state of the world. Standard logic considers only true/false evaluations, but there
are also many-valued logics, in which the truth values range over a set, say P = {0,1, . . . , p − 1}.
A common interpretation is that 0 means absolutely false and p − 1 means absolutely true, with
intermediate degrees of truth in-between. Given an agenda A consisting of m propositions in such a
logic, we let X be the subset of Pm containing the logically consistent evaluations of the propositions
in A. The problem is how to aggregate the consistent evaluations held by the individual judges into
a consistent evaluation adopted by the panel of judges.
1 The concept of total blockedness was introduced by Nehring and Puppe [14] to solve a related but different characterization
problem. The ‘if’ direction of our characterization was also proved by Dietrich and List [3].
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of m given events in a certain sample space. Here P is the interval [0,1], and X is the subset of Pm
containing those probability evaluations of the m events that are feasible, namely, compatible with the
axioms of probability. The question is how to aggregate the feasible probability evaluations submitted
by the individual experts into a feasible probability evaluation adopted by the panel.
We are interested in aggregators f : Xn → X that satisfy properties analogous to those considered
in the binary case. The IIA property extends naturally to the non-binary case. It requires that the social
position on any given issue should depend only on the individual positions on that same issue (the
acronym is better interpreted as Issue-by-Issue Aggregation). This is admittedly a strong requirement,
but we observe that the non-binary framework allows us to weaken its bite when it is deemed too
strong. Suppose, for example, that we face a binary evaluation problem, but we deem a certain triple
of issues to be relevant to each other, so that the social position on each of them should be allowed
to depend on the individual positions on all three of them. Then we can re-model the problem by
combining the three issues into one composite issue admitting 23 = 8 conceivable positions. Requiring
the IIA property in this new model correctly captures the relevance structure.2 This illustrates why
we should be interested in the aggregation of non-binary evaluations, even if the original issues are
binary in nature.
Regarding the Pareto property, there are two non-equivalent ways to extend it to the non-binary
case. We say that f is Paretian if, whenever all individuals hold the same position on an issue, the
society adopts that position. We say that f is supportive if, on any issue, the social position is one
of the positions held by the individuals on that issue; in other words, the social position on any
issue must have the support of at least one individual. Note that while the two properties coincide in
the binary case, in general the latter is stronger than the former. Both require respecting unanimity,
but supportiveness also requires that a unanimously rejected position be rejected by the society. The
appeal of supportiveness depends on whether or not the set of positions P has additional structure
that the aggregator may reasonably exploit. Thus, in Examples C and D above, where the elements
form a scale, supportiveness is unattractive (in particular, in the probabilities example it rules out
taking the average of the individual evaluations as the aggregate evaluation). But in examples such
as A and B above, where there is no natural order on the elements of P , supportiveness makes a lot
of sense. In the present paper we focus on IIA and supportive aggregators, and thus our results are
interesting mainly for applications in which the set of positions P has no inner structure. We leave
the study of aggregation under the weaker Pareto property for separate research.
We call the set X of feasible evaluations an impossibility domain if any IIA and supportive aggre-
gator f : Xn → X must be dictatorial. The main question that we address in the non-binary case is
what structural conditions on X make it an impossibility domain. In Theorem 1 we give two such
conditions which together are suﬃcient for X to be an impossibility domain. The ﬁrst of them is
total blockedness, adapted in a non-trivial way from the binary case. The second condition is that
X should be multiply constrained; this is a mild condition that requires the existence of some con-
straint on feasibility that involves more than two issues. Comparing this pair of conditions with the
two conditions in our earlier result for the binary case, we note two differences: (a) The condition
of multiple constrainedness did not appear in the binary case result (although it was used in its
proof), due to the fact that it is a consequence of total blockedness in the binary case (but not in
the general case). (b) On the other hand, no analogue of the non-aﬃneness condition is needed in
the non-binary case; indeed, its role in the binary case was to guarantee the monotonicity of the
aggregator, which in the non-binary case follows (in a non-trivial way) from our other assumptions.
As an application of Theorem 1, we obtain a general impossibility result for aggregating assignments
(Example A).
2 More generally, such re-modeling can handle in a satisfactory way any situation in which the relevance relation among the
original issues is an equivalence relation. For a treatment that stays within the binary framework, but can handle any relevance
relation, see Dietrich [2]. For models that require IIA only on some issues, see Mongin [13] and Dietrich and Mongin [6].
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dition for X to be an impossibility domain. In other words, if X is not totally blocked then there
do exist IIA and supportive aggregators f : Xn → X which are not dictatorial; in fact, we show their
existence for any n  2. The situation regarding the condition of multiple constrainedness is more
complex: examples show that it is not a necessary condition for X to be an impossibility domain, but
it cannot be entirely removed from Theorem 1 without hindering suﬃciency. Still, as the condition of
multiple constrainedness is mild and is satisﬁed in most of the interesting applications, the gap be-
tween our suﬃcient conditions for impossibility and our necessary condition for it may be considered
to be small.
We do close this remaining gap in the ternary case, that is, when only three positions are allowed
on each issue. Theorem 3 gives a full characterization in the ternary case: X is an impossibility do-
main if and only if it is totally blocked and it is either multiply constrained or exclusive. The latter
condition requires the existence of an issue k, so that for each of the three positions on k there exists
a position on another issue  which is incompatible with it but is compatible with the other two
positions on k. This may be understood as identifying a type of forbidden conﬁguration, the existence
of which characterizes impossibility in the case left open by the earlier conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model formally, state the gen-
eral Theorems 1 and 2, and illustrate them with some examples. The two theorems are proved in
Section 3. We state and prove Theorem 3 on the ternary case in Section 4.
We conclude the introduction with a brief survey of relevant literature, emphasizing contributions
to the non-binary case. Arrow’s [1] celebrated impossibility theorem showed that in the problem of
preference aggregation, the IIA and Pareto properties force the aggregator to be dictatorial when at
least three alternatives are present. Wilson [19] introduced an abstract model of aggregation of bi-
nary evaluations, and showed that Arrow’s theorem applies not only to preference aggregation but
also to other aggregation problems satisfying certain conditions. Rubinstein and Fishburn [16] ex-
tended Wilson’s model to allow non-binary evaluations, as we do here. However, their approach was
algebraic, and this led them to assume that the set of positions is a ﬁeld; no algebraic structure plays
a role in our treatment. Both Wilson and Rubinstein–Fishburn raised the question of characterizing
impossibility domains, but their results gave only suﬃcient conditions for impossibility to hold, which
were far from necessary.
Kalai [11] proposed a different way to generalize Arrow’s theorem. In his approach, the objects to
be aggregated are choice functions, in the sense explained in Example B above (note that when the
subsets from which choices are made are all pairs of alternatives, and the feasible choice functions
are the rationalizable ones, this is equivalent to standard preference aggregation). He made a con-
jecture that extends Arrow’s theorem by considering choice functions from subsets of arbitrary size
(thus, non-binary), and any class of feasible choice functions which is symmetric with respect to the
alternatives. Shelah [17] proved a version of Kalai’s conjecture, assuming that the size of the subsets
from which choices are made is neither very small, nor very close to the total number of alternatives.
Their model is a special case of ours, with additional combinatorial structure and symmetry.3
The rich recent literature on judgment aggregation, starting from the ﬁrst impossibility theorem
of List and Pettit [12], dealt mostly with sets of propositions in a two-valued logic (corresponding
to binary evaluations). Pauly and van Hees [15] and van Hees [18] did obtain impossibility theorems
for judgment aggregation in many-valued logic, in the sense explained in Example C above. But these
results were conﬁned to some speciﬁc logics and to agendas satisfying certain richness conditions,
making their set-up much more special than ours. Gärdenfors [9] and Dietrich and List [5] dealt
with incomplete judgment sets in two-valued logic, which is equivalent to allowing three positions
(true/false/abstain) on each proposition, as modeled by us in [8]. But in these models the primitive
notion of consistency or feasibility is in a binary setting, and the feasibility of three-valued evaluations
is derived from it, not exogenously given as in the present paper.
3 We have derived from our results here a generalization of Shelah’s theorem, which consists in relaxing the restrictions on
the subset size to the weakest possible ones. This derivation, though shorter than Shelah’s original proof, is still quite tedious,
and therefore it is not included in this paper.
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been studied in the statistics literature, mostly under the assumption that the probabilities of all
events in the sample space need to be evaluated; see a survey by Genest and Zidek [10]. Recently,
inspired by the judgment aggregation model, Dietrich and List [4] offered a treatment of probability
aggregation with an arbitrary family of events to be evaluated.
2. The model and the general results
We consider a ﬁnite, non-empty set of issues J . For convenience, if there are m issues in J , we
identify J with the set {1, . . . ,m} of coordinates of vectors of length m. There is a non-empty, possibly
inﬁnite set P of conceivable positions on each of the issues in J . An evaluation is an m-tuple x =
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Pm specifying a position on each issue. There is a prescribed non-empty subset X of Pm .
The evaluations in X are called feasible, the others are infeasible.4
The projection of the set X on the j-th coordinate is denoted by X j , and its elements are referred
to as the feasible positions on issue j. Note that there is no loss of generality in using the same set
P of conceivable positions for all issues, as the subsets X j ⊆ P of feasible positions may differ across
issues. We say that X is binary if |X j| 2 for every j ∈ J , and non-binary otherwise.
A society is a ﬁnite, non-empty set N of individuals. For convenience, if there are n individuals
in N , we identify N with the set {1, . . . ,n}. If we specify a feasible evaluation xi = (xi1, . . . , xim) ∈ X for
each individual i ∈ N , we obtain a proﬁle of feasible evaluations x= (xij) ∈ Xn . We may view a proﬁle
as an n×m matrix all of whose rows lie in X . We use superscripts to indicate individuals (rows) and
subscripts to indicate issues (columns).
An aggregator for N over X is a mapping f : Xn → X . It assigns to every possible proﬁle of individ-
ual feasible evaluations, a social evaluation which is also feasible. Any aggregator f may be written
in the form f = ( f1, . . . , fm) where f j is the j-th component of f . That is, f j : Xn → X j assigns to
every proﬁle the social position on issue j.
An aggregator f is IIA if for every j ∈ J and any two proﬁles x,y ∈ Xn satisfying xij = yij for all
i ∈ N , we have f j(x) = f j(y). This means that the social position on a given issue is determined
entirely by the individual positions on that same issue. Viewing proﬁles as matrices, this says that the
aggregation is done column-by-column. As we shall deal with IIA aggregators, we will slightly abuse
notation and write also expressions of the form f j(x j), where x j = (x1j , . . . , xnj ) is the column vector
of individual positions on issue j. That is, we will treat f j also as mapping Xnj into X j .
An IIA aggregator f is supportive if we have f j(x j) ∈ {x1j , . . . , xnj } for every j ∈ J and every x j =
(x1j , . . . , x
n
j ) ∈ Xnj . This means that the social position on any issue must be one of the individual
positions on that issue.5
An aggregator f is dictatorial if there exists an individual d ∈ N such that f (x) = xd for every
x ∈ Xn . That is to say, the society always adopts the dictator’s evaluation. A dictatorial aggregator is
trivially IIA and supportive.
We say that X is an impossibility domain if for every society N , every IIA and supportive aggrega-
tor for N over X is dictatorial. Otherwise we say that X is a possibility domain. By this deﬁnition,
X is a possibility domain if for some n there exists a non-dictatorial IIA and supportive aggrega-
tor f : Xn → X . It will turn out, however, that in this case such aggregators exist for all n  3 (and
sometimes also for n = 2).
4 Our impossibility results extend in a straightforward way to a model with inﬁnitely-many issues. The possibility results
require compactness in the following sense: every infeasible evaluation has a restriction to a ﬁnite set of issues which is
infeasible (i.e., cannot be completed to a feasible evaluation).
5 Note that in the binary case supportiveness is equivalent to the Pareto property, which requires that f j(u, . . . ,u) = u for
every j ∈ J and every u ∈ X j . But in the general case supportiveness is stronger. We observe that both properties may be
deﬁned more generally for any aggregator, not necessarily IIA, by global conditions that refer to the entire proﬁle. Thus f
is Paretian if we have f (x) = x whenever the proﬁle x is such that xi = x for all i ∈ N; and f is supportive if we have
f j(x) ∈ {x1j , . . . , xnj } for every j ∈ J and every proﬁle x such that for all i, i′ ∈ N , xij = xi
′
j implies x
i = xi′ . These are conceptually
less demanding deﬁnitions which, in the presence of IIA, yield the issue-by-issue deﬁnitions given above.
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or an impossibility domain. We start by introducing some terminology and tools that will be used
to describe the structure of X . Note that X is a subset of the Cartesian product
∏m
j=1 X j , and we
may assume that |X j| 2 for all j (an issue j with |X j| = 1 may be discarded without affecting the
problem). A sub-box is a subset B of
∏m
j=1 X j of the form B =
∏m
j=1 B j , where B j ⊆ X j for each j. We
call such B a 2-sub-box if |B j | = 2 for each j. The set X induces a set of feasible evaluations in each
sub-box B , namely the set X ∩ B . When B is a 2-sub-box, this puts us in a setting that is isomorphic
to the binary case of our problem. We will exploit this to lift known concepts from the binary case
to the general case. These concepts are originally due, in the binary case, to Nehring and Puppe [14],
but we follow and adapt the terminology we introduced in [7].
Let X be a subset of Pm , let B be a ﬁxed sub-box, and let K be a subset of J . A K -evaluation
within B is a vector x = (x j) j∈K ∈∏ j∈K B j ; this is a partial evaluation assigning values to issues in
K only, and lying in the corresponding projection of B . Such x is said to be feasible within B if it can
be completed (by assigning values also to issues in J \ K ) to an evaluation in X ∩ B; otherwise, it is
infeasible within B . A minimally infeasible partial evaluation within B (abbreviated B-MIPE) is a vector
x = (x j) j∈K ∈ ∏ j∈K B j that is infeasible within B , but such that every restriction of x to a proper
subset of K is feasible within B . The B-MIPEs are thus the minimal obstacles to feasibility within B .
We will also use the above terminology without specifying a sub-box B , when we refer to the whole
box, that is, B =∏mj=1 X j .
Our ﬁrst condition on X will be expressed in terms of a directed graph GX associated with X , that
we proceed to deﬁne. The vertices of GX are labeled by the triples uu′j , where j ∈ J and u,u′ ∈ X j ,
u = u′ . Thus we have ∑mj=1 |X j|(|X j| − 1) vertices (note that this number is inﬁnite if some X j is
inﬁnite). The vertex uu′j is to be interpreted as holding position u rather than u
′ on issue j, in the
sense that u is the position held on j if only positions u and u′ are available. There is an arc in GX
from vertex uu′k to vertex vv
′
 (written uu
′
k → vv ′) if and only if k =  and there exist a 2-sub-box
B =∏mj=1 B j with Bk = {u,u′} and B = {v, v ′} and a B-MIPE x = (x j) j∈K such that {k, } ⊆ K and
xk = u, x = v ′ . For such B , x, and K , we also write uu′k −−−−→B,x,K vv ′ . We call the relation uu′k → vv ′
relative conditional entailment, with the following interpretation. If uu′k −−−−→B,x,K vv ′ then relative to B
and conditional on holding the positions prescribed in x on all issues in K \ {k, }, holding position u
rather than u′ on issue k entails holding position v rather than v ′ on issue , because x is infeasible
within B . Note that the minimality of x implies that there exists a feasible evaluation in B with
entries u on k and v on  that agrees with x on K \ {k, }, and similarly for u′ on k and v ′ on .6
We write uu′k →→ vv ′ if there exists a directed path in GX from uu′k to vv ′ . Finally, we say that
X is totally blocked if GX is strongly connected, that is, for any two vertices uu′k and vv
′
 we have
uu′k →→ vv ′ .
The length of a B-MIPE x = (x j) j∈K is |K |. We say that X is multiply constrained if there exists a
sub-box B for which there exists a B-MIPE of length at least 3.
We are now ready to state our two general results, providing suﬃcient and necessary conditions,
respectively, for X to be an impossibility domain.
Theorem 1. Let X be a non-binary subset of Pm. If X is totally blocked and multiply constrained then X is an
impossibility domain.
Theorem 2. Let X be a subset of Pm. If X is not totally blocked then X is a possibility domain; in fact, for every
society N of 2 or more individuals there exists a non-dictatorial IIA and supportive aggregator for N over X.
6 For a ﬁxed 2-sub-box B , our notion of relative conditional entailment is the same as that of conditional entailment in the
binary case. In the non-binary case, a MIPE in the whole box does not give rise to a conditional entailment relation, since there
is more than one alternative to a given position on a given issue. That is why we had to restrict to two available positions on
each of the issues k and . The restriction of positions on the other issues is not needed for the deﬁnition to make sense, but
turns out to be needed for our results. Note that it renders the condition of total blockedness weaker than it would be without
it.
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Theorem 1 to the problem of aggregating assignments presented in Example A in the introduction.
Corollary 1. Let |P | = p and | J | =m, with p m 4. Let
X = {(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Pm ∣∣ x1, . . . , xm are pairwise distinct}
be the set of feasible assignments (of people in P to the jobs in J ). Then X is an impossibility domain.
Proof. Clearly, X j = P for all j ∈ J , so X is non-binary. For any k,  ∈ J , k = , and any u, v,w ∈ P ,
v = u = w , we have uvk → wu . Indeed, there exist y = (y1, . . . , ym), z = (z1, . . . , zm) in X with
yk = u, y = w , zk = v , z = u, and we can take B to be a 2-sub-box that contains y and z and
x = (xk, x) to be the B-MIPE with xk = x = u, to witness that uvk → wu . Using this fact repeatedly,
we show that X is totally blocked. Indeed, it suﬃces to show that uu′k →→ vv ′ for any two vertices
with k = . If u = v ′ this holds in one step, and otherwise taking j ∈ J \ {k, } we have uu′k →
v ′u j → vv ′ . Next, we check that X is multiply constrained by taking four distinct elements t,u, v,w
of P and considering the sub-box B with B1 = {t,u}, B2 = {t, v}, B3 = {t,w}, B4 = {u, v,w}, B j = P
for 5 j m, and the B-MIPE (x1, x2, x3) with x1 = u, x2 = v , x3 = w . It now follows from Theorem 1
that X is an impossibility domain. 
Two comments are in order about Corollary 1. First, note that its proof takes advantage of the
fact that the deﬁnition of multiple constrainedness does not require a MIPE of length at least 3 in
the whole box, just in some sub-box. Indeed, it is easy to see that in this example all MIPEs have
length 2, but we were able to ﬁnd a suitable sub-box B with a B-MIPE of length 3. Secondly, although
the corollary was stated here for p m 4 (to allow the construction of a sub-box B as mentioned),
it does in fact hold true more generally for all p m such that p  3 and m 2. We omit the proof
of this fact, which uses ideas that will be developed in Section 4. This fact shows, in particular, that
unlike total blockedness, multiple constrainedness is not a necessary condition for an impossibility
domain.
Next we apply Theorem 2 to a special case of the problem of judgment aggregation in many-valued
logic presented in Example C. Recall that in the introduction we pointed out that supportiveness may
be too strong a requirement in the context of this problem. But here we obtain a possibility result,
which is only strengthened by our use of supportiveness rather than the plain Pareto property.
Example 1. Consider the agenda A = {α,β,α ∧ β}, and suppose that each proposition ϕ in A may
be assigned any truth value T (ϕ) in P = {0,1, . . . , p − 1}, subject to the consistency requirement
T (α ∧ β) = min{T (α), T (β)}. This leads to the set of feasible evaluations:
X = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ P3 ∣∣ x3 = min{x1, x2}}.
Note that any feasible evaluation with a 0 entry must have at least two 0 entries; and conversely, any
evaluation with at least two 0 entries is feasible, except (0,0, x3) with x3 = 0. It follows that GX does
not contain any arc from a vertex of the form 0uk to one of the form vw with v = 0. Indeed, such an
arc would require the existence of an infeasible evaluation with xk = 0, x = w that becomes feasible
upon replacing w by v = 0, which is impossible by the above. Thus X is not totally blocked and
hence, by Theorem 2, it is a possibility domain. This can also be veriﬁed directly, by noting that the
‘least-belief’ rule x j = min{xij | i ∈ N} for j = 1,2,3 yields an aggregator with the required properties.
Our last example in this section will show that the assumption of multiple constrainedness, al-
though not a necessary condition for impossibility, cannot be entirely dropped from Theorem 1
without losing suﬃciency. In other words, there do exist non-binary totally blocked possibility do-
mains.
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notation u = (u,u) for u ∈ P . We think of the m issues as ordered cyclically, identifying the subscript
m + 1 with 1. Consider the set of feasible evaluations:
X = {(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Pm ∣∣ x j = x j+1 for j = 1, . . . ,m}.
Clearly |X j| = |P | = 4 for all j ∈ J , so X is non-binary. Any two vertices of the form uu′j and vv ′j+1,
where u = u′ = v ′ = v , are joined in GX by arcs going in both directions; this is because, as m  3,
on issues j and j + 1 positions u and v are compatible, and so are u′ and v ′ , but u and v ′ are not,
and nor are u′ and v . Using these arcs, it is easy to see that X is totally blocked. However, X is a
possibility domain: assuming that n is odd (or replacing N in the following by an odd cardinality
subset) the ‘bit-by-bit majority’ rule whereby x j = maj{xij | i ∈ N} and x j = maj{xij | i ∈ N} for all j ∈ J
yields an aggregator with the required properties.
The example just given may be understood as a binary example with unrestricted domain, embed-
ded as a restricted quaternary domain. But it is by no means true that all totally blocked possibility
domains are derived from binary underlying examples. See, for instance, Example 4 in Section 4.
3. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
3.1. Winning coalitions and 2-neutrality
Throughout the proof of Theorem 1, we consider an IIA and supportive aggregator f : Xn → X . In
each step of the proof, we will establish properties of f , using some of the conditions on X assumed
in the theorem and/or some of the properties of f established earlier (the conditions and properties
used in each step will be stated explicitly). Eventually we will show that f is dictatorial.
We consider the components f j of f . Given the IIA property, each f j will be viewed as mapping
columns of positions on issue j, of the form x j = (x1j , . . . , xnj ) ∈ Xnj , into X j . Several of the properties of
f will be expressed in terms of the behavior of the f j on columns that consist of at most 2 different
positions. This behavior is captured by the collections of winning coalitions deﬁned as follows. For
an issue j and an ordered pair of distinct positions u,u′ ∈ X j , we say that a subset S of N is a
uu′j-winning coalition if
xij =
{
u if i ∈ S
u′ if i ∈ N \ S ⇒ f j(x j) = u.
Thus, S is uu′j-winning if it prevails on issue j when its members hold the position u while the
others hold the position u′ . We denote by Wuu′j the collection of all uu′j-winning coalitions. As f is
supportive, we have N ∈ Wuu′j and ∅ /∈ Wuu
′
j for every j,u,u
′ , and moreover S ∈ Wuu′j ⇔ N \ S /∈ Wu
′u
j
(we will refer to the latter as duality). We say that f is 2-neutral if all the collections of winning
coalitions coincide, that is, there exists one collection of winning coalitions, that we denote by W ,
such that Wuu′j = W for every j,u,u′ . This property means that when it comes to choosing between
2 positions on an issue, f treats equally all positions on all issues.
Lemma 1. If uu′k → vv ′ in the graph GX then Wuu
′
k ⊆ W vv
′
 .
Proof. Suppose that uu′k −−−−→B,x,K vv ′ for a suitable 2-sub-box B and a B-MIPE x = (x j) j∈K . Assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that the coalition S is in Wuu′k but not in W vv
′
 . In Table 1 we construct
a proﬁle of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation, all restricted to issues in K (for
ease of exposition, we assume that K = {1, . . . , r} and k = 1,  = 2).
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Construction for Lemma 1.
1 2 3 · · · r
S u v x3 · · · xr
N \ S u′ v ′ x3 · · · xr
u v ′ x3 · · · xr
The fact that uu′1 −−−−→B,x,K vv ′2 implies that each of the rows corresponding to S and N \ S in the
table is feasible within B , i.e., may be completed to an evaluation in X ∩ B . As f is supportive, the
resulting social evaluation must also lie in X ∩ B . However, by our assumptions on S and supportive-
ness, the social positions on issues in K are as indicated in the table, and thus coincide with x, which
is infeasible within B . 
Proposition 1. If X is totally blocked then f is 2-neutral.
Proof. By repeated applications of Lemma 1, it follows that uu′k →→ vv ′ implies Wuu
′
k ⊆ W vv
′
 .
Therefore, if X is totally blocked then all the collections of winning coalitions coincide. 
3.2. Establishing 2-monotonicity
We say that f is 2-monotone if each of the collections Wuu′j is closed with respect to supersets:
S ∈ Wuu′j and S ⊂ T imply T ∈ Wuu
′
j .
Proposition 2. If X is non-binary and totally blocked then f is 2-monotone.
Proof. By Proposition 1, f is 2-neutral. The failure of 2-monotonicity can then be stated as the exis-
tence of S ⊂ T such that S ∈ W , T /∈ W ; or equivalently, the existence of a partition S1, S2, S3 of N
with S1, S2 ∈ W (taking S1 = S , S2 = N \ T , S3 = T \ S). We ﬁx such a partition and work towards a
contradiction. For any j ∈ J and any (a,b, c) ∈ X3j , the value assumed by f j on the column in which
the members of S1 hold position a, those of S2 hold position b, and those of S3 hold position c, will
be denoted (by a slight abuse of notation) f j(a,b, c). We need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ X be ﬁxed. If uu′k → vv ′ in the graph GX and fk(u,u′, yk) = yk then
f(v, v ′, y) = y .
Proof. Suppose that uu′k −−−−→B,x,K vv ′ for a suitable 2-sub-box B and a B-MIPE x = (x j) j∈K . For
ease of exposition, we assume that K = {1, . . . , r} and k = 1,  = 2. As x is a B-MIPE, there ex-
ists z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ X ∩ B with z1 = u, z2 = v, z j = x j for j = 3, . . . , r, and there exists z′ =
(z′1, . . . , z′m) ∈ X ∩ B with z′1 = u′ , z′2 = v ′ , z′j = x j for j = 3, . . . , r. Using these two evaluations and
the ﬁxed evaluation y in the statement of the lemma, we construct in Table 2 a proﬁle of feasible
evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ X .
The social position on issue 1 is determined by an assumption of the lemma. We assume, for the
sake of contradiction, that s2 = y2, and hence by supportiveness s2 ∈ {v, v ′}. Using now s as the third
row, we construct in Table 3 another proﬁle of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation
that we denote by t = (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ X .
For j = 3, . . . , r we have t j = s j for the following reason: if s j = y j then column j is the same as in
Table 2, and otherwise by supportiveness s j = x j and t j = x j . Regarding s2 and t2 we have two cases.
In the ﬁrst case, s2 = v and therefore, since S2 ∈ W , t2 = v ′ . In this case we use t as the second row
and s as the third, constructing in Table 4 yet another proﬁle of feasible evaluations and the resulting
social evaluation that we denote by w = (w1, . . . ,wm) ∈ X .
The social positions on issues 1, . . . , r are implied by our assumptions that S1, S2 ∈ W . For j =
r + 1, . . . ,m we have w j ∈ B j . Indeed, if t j = s j then, since S1 ∈ W , we have w j = z j ∈ B j . If t j = s j ,
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First construction for Lemma 2.
1 2 3 · · · r r + 1 · · · m
S1 u v x3 · · · xr zr+1 · · · zm
S2 u′ v ′ x3 · · · xr z′r+1 · · · z′m
S3 y1 y2 y3 · · · yr yr+1 · · · ym
y1 s2 s3 · · · sr sr+1 · · · sm
Table 3
Second construction for Lemma 2.
1 2 3 · · · r r + 1 · · · m
S1 u v x3 · · · xr zr+1 · · · zm
S2 u′ v ′ x3 · · · xr z′r+1 · · · z′m
S3 y1 s2 s3 · · · sr sr+1 · · · sm
y1 t2 s3 · · · sr tr+1 · · · tm
Table 4
Third construction for Lemma 2.
1 2 3 · · · r r + 1 · · · m
S1 u v x3 · · · xr zr+1 · · · zm
S2 y1 v ′ s3 · · · sr tr+1 · · · tm
S3 y1 v s3 · · · sr sr+1 · · · sm
u v ′ x3 · · · xr wr+1 · · · wm
this means that the column j outcomes in Tables 2 and 3 differ, which must be because s j = y j . By
supportiveness, this implies that s j ∈ {z j, z′j}, which implies that t j ∈ {z j, z′j}, which in turn implies
that w j ∈ {z j, z′j} ⊆ B j . It follows that w ∈ X ∩ B , contradicting the fact that x is a B-MIPE with
x1 = u, x2 = v ′ .
In the remaining case, s2 = v ′ and therefore, since S1 ∈ W , t2 = v . In this case, we redo the
construction in Table 4 with the roles of s and t interchanged, and reach the same contradiction. 
Returning to the proof of Proposition 2, we treat now the following case.
Case 1. There exist j ∈ J and pairwise distinct a,b, c ∈ X j such that f j(a,b, c) = c.
Since X is totally blocked, we have ab j →→ ac j . We ﬁx y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ X with y j = c, and
apply Lemma 2 repeatedly along a path in GX from ab j to ac j . The initial assumption that f j(a,b, c) =
c carries over along the path to the ﬁnal conclusion that f j(a, c, c) = c. However, the latter contradicts
the fact that S1 ∈ W .
Note that if S3 ∈ W then S1, S2, S3 play symmetric roles in our assumptions. The fact that X is
non-binary means that there exist j ∈ J and pairwise distinct a,b, c ∈ X j , and so the assumption of
Case 1 holds without loss of generality. Thus we may assume that S3 /∈ W . This implies that whenever
a,b, c ∈ X j are not pairwise distinct, we have f j(a,b, c) ∈ {a,b}. Therefore, in negating Case 1 we can
refer to all, not necessarily pairwise distinct triples, getting the following.
Case 2. For all j ∈ J and all a,b, c ∈ X j we have f j(a,b, c) ∈ {a,b}.
Now we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Assume Case 2 holds, and let y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ X be ﬁxed. If uu′k → vv ′ in the graph GX and
fk(u,u′, yk) = u then f(v, v ′, y) = v.
E. Dokow, R. Holzman / Advances in Applied Mathematics 45 (2010) 487–504 497Table 5
Construction for Proposition 3.
1 2 3 4 · · · r
S x′1 x2 x3 x4 · · · xr
T x1 x′2 x3 x4 · · · xr
N \ U x1 x2 x′3 x4 · · · xr
x1 x2 x3 x4 · · · xr
Proof. Consider again the construction in Table 2, with resulting social evaluation s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈
X . By our current assumption, s1 = u. We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that s2 = v . By
the assumption of Case 2, this implies that s2 = v ′ . The same assumption implies that s j = x j for
j = 3, . . . , r and s j ∈ {z j, z′j} ⊆ B j for j = r + 1, . . . ,m. This contradicts the fact that x is a B-MIPE. 
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2 by treating the remaining Case 2. We ﬁx any
j ∈ J and distinct a,b ∈ X j , and some y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ X with y j = b. We apply Lemma 3 repeat-
edly along a path in GX from ab j to ba j . Initially we have f j(a,b,b) = a because S1 ∈ W , and this
carries over along the path to yield ﬁnally f j(b,a,b) = b. However, the latter contradicts the fact
that S2 ∈ W . 
3.3. Establishing 2-decomposability
Assume that f is 2-neutral. We say that f is 2-decomposable if for every U ∈ W and every parti-
tion S, T of U we have either S ∈ W or T ∈ W .
Proposition 3. If X is multiply constrained and f is 2-neutral then f is 2-decomposable.
Proof. Let B be a sub-box and x = (x j) j∈K be a B-MIPE with |K |  3. Assume, for the sake of con-
tradiction, that S, T /∈ W , S ∩ T = ∅, and U = S ∪ T ∈ W . Now, consider the construction in Table 5
(where for ease of exposition K = {1, . . . , r}).
The fact that x is a B-MIPE guarantees that for j = 1,2,3 there exists x′j ∈ B j so that the j-th row
in the table is feasible within B . However, by our assumptions on S, T , and U and supportiveness, the
resulting social positions coincide with x, which is infeasible within B . 
3.4. Establishing 2-dictatorship
We say that f is 2-dictatorial if there exists an individual d ∈ N so that each of the collections
Wuu′j is equal to {S ⊆ N | d ∈ S}. This means that d prevails on any issue when the individuals hold
at most 2 distinct positions on that issue.
Proposition 4. If f is 2-neutral, 2-monotone, and 2-decomposable, then it is 2-dictatorial.
Proof. Let U be a winning coalition of minimum cardinality (this is well deﬁned because N ∈ W).
If |U |  2 then we get a contradiction to minimality by using 2-decomposability. Clearly |U | = 0 is
impossible since ∅ /∈ W . Hence there exists d ∈ N such that U = {d}. By 2-monotonicity it follows that
{S ⊆ N | d ∈ S} ⊆ W , and the reverse inclusion follows by duality. 
3.5. From 2-dictatorship to dictatorship
Proposition 5. If X is totally blocked and f is 2-dictatorial then f is dictatorial.
Proof. Let d be the 2-dictator for f . Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that d is not a dictator
for f . Then there exists at least one instance of p ∈ J and xp = (x1p, . . . , xnp) ∈ Xnp so that f p(xp) = xdp .
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First construction for Lemma 4.
1 2 3 · · · r r + 1 · · · m
S1 u v x3 · · · xr zr+1 · · · zm
S2 u′ v ′ x3 · · · xr z′r+1 · · · z′m
S3 y31 y
3
2 y
3
3 · · · y3r y3r+1 · · · y3m· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
Sq y
q
1 y
q
2 y
q
3 · · · yqr yqr+1 · · · yqm
u s2 x3 · · · xr sr+1 · · · sm
Table 7
Second construction for Lemma 4.
1 2 3 · · · r r + 1 · · · m
S1 u s2 x3 · · · xr sr+1 · · · sm
S2 u′ v ′ x3 · · · xr z′r+1 · · · z′m
S3 y31 y
3
2 y
3
3 · · · y3r y3r+1 · · · y3m· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
Sq y
q
1 y
q
2 y
q
3 · · · yqr yqr+1 · · · yqm
u v ′ x3 · · · xr tr+1 · · · tm
Choose one instance so that the number q of distinct positions appearing in xp is the smallest possible
among all such instances. Necessarily q  3, since d is a 2-dictator. Enumerate the distinct posi-
tions appearing in xp as w1, . . . ,wq , with w1 = f p(xp) and w2 = xdp . Let Sh = {i ∈ N | xip = wh},
h = 1, . . . ,q, be the partition of N according to the positions held in xp (note that d ∈ S2). For any
k ∈ J and any (a1, . . . ,aq) ∈ Xqk , the value assumed by fk on the column in which the members of
Sh hold position ah , h = 1, . . . ,q, will be denoted (by a slight abuse of notation) fk(a1, . . . ,aq). Using
this notation, we have f p(w1, . . . ,wq) = w1. Note that by the minimality of q, for any k ∈ J and
any a1, . . . ,aq ∈ Xk that are not pairwise distinct, we have fk(a1, . . . ,aq) = a2. We need the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. Let yh = (yh1, . . . , yhm) ∈ X, h = 3, . . . ,q, be q− 2 ﬁxed evaluations. If uu′k → vv ′ in the graph GX
and fk(u,u′, y3k , . . . , y
q
k) = u then f(v, v ′, y3, . . . , yq) = v.
Proof. Suppose that uu′k −−−−→B,x,K vv ′ for a suitable 2-sub-box B and a B-MIPE x = (x j) j∈K . For ease
of exposition, we assume that K = {1, . . . , r} and k = 1,  = 2. As x is a B-MIPE, there exists z =
(z1, . . . , zm) ∈ X ∩ B with z1 = u, z2 = v , z j = x j for j = 3, . . . , r, and there exists z′ = (z′1, . . . , z′m) ∈
X ∩ B with z′1 = u′ , z′2 = v ′ , z′j = x j for j = 3, . . . , r. Using these two evaluations and the q − 2 ﬁxed
evaluations in the statement of the lemma, we construct in Table 6 a proﬁle of feasible evaluations
and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ X .
The social position on issue 1 is determined by an assumption of the lemma, and those on issues
3, . . . , r by the existence of repeated values in those columns (which forces the outcome to be the
position of S2). We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that s2 = v . Using now s as the ﬁrst row,
we construct in Table 7 another proﬁle of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that
we denote by t = (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ X .
The social position on issue 2 is v ′ because we assume s2 = v and hence, by supportiveness, s2 is
one of the other values in that column. For j = r + 1, . . . ,m we have t j ∈ B j . Indeed, if s j = z j then
column j is the same in both tables, and therefore t j = s j = z j ∈ B j . Otherwise, s j is one of the other
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is a B-MIPE. 
Returning to the proof of Proposition 5, we recall that for a particular p ∈ J and (w1, . . . ,wq) ∈ Xqp
we have f p(w1, . . . ,wq) = w1. We choose the q − 2 evaluations yh = (yh1, . . . , yhm) ∈ X so that
yhp = wh , h = 3, . . . ,q. We apply Lemma 4 repeatedly along a path in GX from w1w2p to w1w3p .
The initial assumption that f p(w1, . . . ,wq) = w1 carries over along the path to the ﬁnal conclusion
that f p(w1,w3,w3, . . . ,wq) = w1. Since the latter q-tuple contains repeated values, this is a contra-
diction. 
Taken together, Propositions 1–5 yield a proof of Theorem 1.
3.6. Proof of Theorem 2
We assume that X is not totally blocked. Hence there exists a partition of the vertices of GX
into two non-empty parts V1 and V2 so that there is no arc in GX from a vertex in V1 to a vertex
in V2. For n  2, we deﬁne a non-dictatorial IIA and supportive aggregator f : Xn → X component-
by-component as follows
f j
(
x1j , . . . , x
n
j
)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x1j = x2j if x1j = x2j ,
x1j if x
1
j = x2j and (x1j )(x2j ) j ∈ V1,
x2j if x
1
j = x2j and (x1j )(x2j ) j ∈ V2.
We only need to show that f = ( f1, . . . , fm) maps Xn into X (the other required properties of f are
obvious). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that f (x) /∈ X for some x ∈ Xn . Fix a 2-sub-box B
that contains x1 and x2. Since f (x) ∈ B \ X , it has a restriction y = (y j) j∈K which is a B-MIPE. There
exist some k ∈ K such that yk = x1k = x2k and some  ∈ K such that y = x2 = x1 (otherwise y would
be contained in x1 or x2, which are in X ∩ B). By the above deﬁnition, we must have (x1k )(x2k )k ∈ V1
and (x1)(x
2
) ∈ V2. We also have (x1k )(x2k )k −−−−→B,y,K (x1)(x2) , which contradicts our assumption about
V1 and V2.
4. The ternary case
The set X of feasible evaluations is ternary if max j∈ J |X j| = 3. In the current section we deal
with this case, and obtain a full characterization of impossibility domains. Theorems 1 and 2, proved
above for the general case, suﬃce in order to classify any multiply constrained X as a possibility or
an impossibility domain. So we focus here on the case when X is not multiply constrained, which
means that all B-MIPEs have length at most 2. In particular, all MIPEs (with respect to the whole box∏m
j=1 X j) are of length 2.
Thus feasibility is determined entirely by a pairwise compatibility relation, which we represent
by a graph HX associated with X . The vertices of HX are labeled as u j , where j ∈ J and u ∈ X j
(so the number of vertices is
∑m
j=1 |X j|). The vertex u j is interpreted as holding position u on is-
sue j. There is an (undirected) edge in HX between uk and v if and only if k =  and x = (xk, x)
with xk = u, x = v is not a MIPE. In this case we say that uk and v are compatible, and write
uk ∼ v; in the other case (when x deﬁned as above is a MIPE) we say that uk and v are incompat-
ible, and write uk  v . Note that for x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈∏mj=1 X j we have x ∈ X if and only if every
two of its entries are compatible (the ‘if’ statement relies on our assumption that all MIPEs are of
length 2).
The condition on X that we need for the characterization of impossibility domains will require
the existence of a certain type of conﬁguration in the compatibility graph HX . Let k be an issue with
|Xk| = 3. We say that a vertex uk is excluded by another vertex v if k =  and we have uk  v ,
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k ∼ v , where u
′ and u′′ are the other two positions in Xk . A vertex uk is said to be
excluded if it is excluded by some other vertex. We say that X is exclusive if there exists an issue k
with |Xk| = 3 so that uk is excluded for every u ∈ Xk .
We are now ready to state our characterization of impossibility domains in the ternary case.
Theorem 3. Let X be a ternary subset of Pm. Then X is an impossibility domain if and only if X is totally
blocked and is either multiply constrained or exclusive.
Before proving Theorem 3, we illustrate it with two examples of ternary sets X . Each of them
is totally blocked and not multiply constrained, and is therefore not settled by Theorems 1 and 2.
The condition of exclusivity distinguishes between them and classiﬁes them as an impossibility and a
possibility domain, respectively.
Example 3. Consider the case p =m = 3 of the problem of aggregating assignments (presented above
in Example A and Corollary 1):
X = {(0,1,2), (0,2,1), (1,0,2), (1,2,0), (2,0,1), (2,1,0)}.
The same argument as in the proof of Corollary 1 shows that X is totally blocked. However, X is not
multiply constrained: a B-MIPE of length 3 would be some x ∈ B \ X , and so it would have two equal
entries, which would be infeasible by themselves. The set X is exclusive because every uk is excluded
by u for  = k. It follows from Theorem 3 that X is an impossibility domain.
Example 4. Let
X = {(0,1,2), (1,2,0), (2,0,1), (0,0,0)}.
To verify that X is totally blocked, we observe that the following is a Hamiltonian cycle in GX :
011 → 022 → 211 → 103 → 201 → 123 → 012 → 023 → 212
→ 101 → 202 → 121 → 013 → 021 → 213 → 102 → 203 → 122 → 011.
To check that X is not multiply constrained, we note that an infeasible x ∈ {0,1,2}3 either has two 1
entries or two 2 entries or equals (up to rotation) one of the following: (0,0,1), (0,0,2), (2,1,0). In
each case, it has two entries that are infeasible by themselves. The set X is not exclusive, because 0k ,
for all k, is not excluded. Indeed, for 0k to be excluded by v we need 0k  v , which implies that
v = 0; but then also vk  v and 0k is not excluded. It follows from Theorem 3 that X is a possibility
domain. This can also be veriﬁed directly, by noting that the ‘majority with 0 as default’ rule yields
an aggregator with the required properties for odd n (or replacing N in the following by an odd car-
dinality subset): x j = maj{xij | i ∈ N} if one of the 3 positions enjoys a majority, and x j = 0 otherwise,
j = 1,2,3.
4.1. Proof of Theorem 3: suﬃciency
The only part of the proof of Theorem 1 that used multiple constrainedness is Proposition 3. The
following substitute for Proposition 3 will therefore yield a proof of the suﬃciency part of Theo-
rem 3.
Proposition 6. If X is exclusive and f is 2-neutral then f is 2-decomposable.
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Construction for Proposition 6.
k 
S1 u v ′
S2 u′ v
S3 u′′ v
u v
Proof. Let k be an issue with Xk = {u,u′,u′′} so that uk,u′k,u′′k are all excluded. The failure of
2-decomposability can be stated as the existence of disjoint S, T /∈ W so that S ∪ T ∈ W ; or equiv-
alently, the existence of a partition S1, S2, S3 of N with S1, S2, S3 /∈ W (taking S1 = S , S2 = T , S3 =
N \ (S ∪ T )). We ﬁx such a partition and apply fk to the column in which the members of S1 hold
position u, those of S2 hold position u′ , and those of S3 hold position u′′ . We assume that the value
of fk on this column is u (this is without loss of generality, due to the symmetry in our assumptions).
Let uk be excluded by v . Consider the construction in Table 8.
The row corresponding to S1 in the table is feasible for some v ′ ∈ X , because u ∈ Xk . The rows
corresponding to S2 and S3 are feasible because u′k ∼ v and u
′′
k ∼ v . The indicated social positions
follow from our assumptions and yield a contradiction to uk  v . 
As a side remark, we point out that Proposition 6 is not speciﬁc to the ternary case. For the general
case, we deﬁne X to be exclusive if there exist an issue k and a triple Yk ⊆ Xk so that for every u ∈ Yk
there exists v with uk  v , u′k ∼ v , u
′′
k ∼ v (where Yk = {u,u′,u′′}). Proposition 6 remains true,
with the same proof, and so the suﬃciency part of Theorem 3 holds true for any non-binary X .7 It is
the necessity part that depends crucially on X being ternary.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 3: necessity
The necessity of total blockedness was already proved (for the general case) in Theorem 2. Thus,
the following proposition will complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Proposition 7. Let X be a ternary subset of Pm. If X is neither multiply constrained nor exclusive then X is a
possibility domain; in fact, for every society N of 3 or more individuals there exists a non-dictatorial IIA and
supportive aggregator for N over X.
Proof. We assume that n is odd (otherwise we can replace N in the following by an odd cardinality
subset). We say that a column (x1j , . . . , x
n
j ) ∈ Xnj of positions on issue j is majoritarian if there exists
u ∈ X j such that |{i ∈ N | xij = u}| > n/2; we denote this u by maj{xij | i ∈ N}. For an issue j and a
ﬁxed position w ∈ X j , we deﬁne the ‘majority with w as default’ rule f wj by
f wj
(
x1j , . . . , x
n
j
)=
{
maj{xij | i ∈ N} if (x1j , . . . , xnj ) is majoritarian,
w otherwise.
We will show that there exists a choice z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ ∏mj=1 X j of defaults for the issues, so
that the resulting f z = ( f z11 , . . . , f zmm ) maps Xn into X . This will suﬃce, because the other required
properties of f z obviously hold regardless of the choice of z (note that supportiveness requires that n
be odd).
7 This observation may be used, for example, to obtain the more general version of the impossibility result for aggregating
assignments, as stated after Corollary 1.
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Next, we will prove that if the choice of defaults z satisﬁes the two conditions then f z maps Xn
into X . Finally, we will show how to choose the defaults so that the two conditions are satisﬁed.
Let J3 = { j ∈ J | |X j| = 3}. We note that we need to discuss only the choices of z j for j ∈ J3; if
|X j| < 3 then every column of positions on issue j is majoritarian, and z j is immaterial. Our condi-
tions are expressed in terms of the compatibility graph HX .
Condition 1. For every k ∈ J3 , the vertex zk of H X is not excluded.
Let k,  ∈ J3, k = . We denote by HkX the bipartite subgraph that HX induces on the 6 vertices
corresponding to Xk and X . We say that the pair k,  is matchable if HkX has a perfect matching,
that is, it contains 3 pairwise disjoint edges (and possibly other edges).
Condition 2. For every k,  ∈ J3 , k = , if k,  is matchable then zk ∼ z .
Assume now that z = (z1, . . . , zm) satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2. Suppose, for the sake of contra-
diction, that f z(x) /∈ X for some x ∈ Xn . For j ∈ J and w ∈ X j we will use the notation Nwj =
{i ∈ N | xij = w} and will refer to this as the support set corresponding to w j . Observe that since
the individual evaluations are feasible, any two support sets that correspond to incompatible vertices
must be disjoint. As f z(x) is infeasible, it contains a MIPE which, by our assumption that X is not
multiply constrained, is necessarily of length 2. So there exist k,  ∈ J , k = , u ∈ Xk , v ∈ X , so that
f zkk (xk) = u, f z (x) = v , and uk  v . Hence we have Nuk ∩ Nv = ∅.
There are three cases to consider depending on whether both, one, or none of the two columns xk
and x is majoritarian.
Case 1. xk and x are majoritarian.
Then both Nuk and N
v
 are majorities, and therefore must intersect, contradicting the above.
Case 2. xk is not majoritarian, x is majoritarian.
Then k ∈ J3 and u = zk . Let u′,u′′ be the other two elements of Xk . By Condition 1, the vertex uk
is not excluded, in particular not by v . Therefore one of u′k,u
′′
k must be incompatible with v , say
u′k  v . This implies that N
u′
k ∩ Nv = ∅ which, together with Nuk ∩ Nv = ∅, implies that Nv ⊆ Nu
′′
k . But
this contradicts the assumption of Case 2, by which Nv is a majority and N
u′′
k is not.
Case 3. xk and x are not majoritarian.
Then k,  ∈ J3 and u = zk, v = z . If k,  is matchable then, by Condition 2, we must have uk ∼ v ,
a contradiction. On the other hand, if HkX has no perfect matching then it must have two vertices so
that every edge is incident to at least one of them (this follows from König’s duality theorem, and
may also be veriﬁed directly for a 3-by-3 bipartite graph). This implies that the union of the support
sets corresponding to these two vertices is N . Hence at least one of these two support sets must be a
majority, contradicting the assumption of Case 3.
It remains to show that z = (z1, . . . , zm) may be chosen so that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. It
will be convenient to use the following notation for k ∈ J3:
Ek = {uk | u ∈ Xk, uk is excluded},
Fk = {uk | u ∈ Xk, uk is not excluded}.
We will need the following lemma.
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which are incompatible. Then every edge of HkX that has one end in Fk has its other end in F , and vice versa.
Proof. By a suitable choice of notation for the vertices, we may assume that uk ∼ v , u′k ∼ v
′
 , u
′′
k ∼ v
′′
 ,
and uk  v ′ , uk ∈ Fk , v ′ ∈ F . Since uk is not excluded, in particular not by v ′ , we must have u′′k  v ′ .
Similarly, since v ′ is not excluded, in particular not by uk , we must have uk  v ′′ . These two derived
incompatibilities in turn imply further ones: as uk is not excluded by v ′′ , we must have u′k  v
′′
 ; and
as v ′ is not excluded by u′′k , we must have u
′′
k  v . Taking stock, we see that the edges of H
k
X include
uk ∼ v , u′k ∼ v
′
 , u
′′
k ∼ v
′′
 , and possibly also u
′
k ∼ v , but no other edge.
We claim that v ∈ F . Indeed, it is clearly not excluded by any vertex in HkX . Suppose that v is
excluded by w j , j = k, . Then we have v  w j , v ′ ∼ w j , v ′′ ∼ w j . Note that if w j is compatible with
a vertex in HkX , and that vertex is incident to only one edge in H
k
X , then w j must be compatible also
with the other end of that edge (to see this, consider a feasible evaluation that includes w j and the
vertex it is known to be compatible with). Using this, we conclude that uk  w j , u′k ∼ w j , u
′′
k ∼ w j ,
so uk is also excluded by w j . This contradicts our assumption that uk ∈ Fk . A similar argument shows
that u′k ∈ Fk . So the four vertices uk,u′k , v, v ′ are in Fk and F respectively.
Regarding u′′k and v
′′
 we distinguish two cases. If u
′
k ∼ v then u
′′
k ∈ Ek and v ′′ ∈ E because they
are excluded by v and u′k , respectively. If u
′
k  v then arguments similar to the above show that
either u′′k ∈ Ek and v ′′ ∈ E or u′′k ∈ Fk and v ′′ ∈ F . In any case, we see that every edge of HkX either
has its two ends in Fk and F , or it has them in Ek and E . 
Returning to the proof of Proposition 7, we introduce an auxiliary graph Γ . The vertex set of Γ
is J3, and vertices k,  ∈ J3, k = , are joined by an (undirected) edge in Γ if k,  satisfy the premises
of Lemma 5. For each connected component C of Γ we proceed as follows. We choose an arbitrary
vertex p of C and some u ∈ Xp so that up ∈ F p (this is possible because we assume that X is not
exclusive). Then we choose some x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X so that xp = u. For each vertex j of C we assign
the corresponding default to be z j = x j . Doing this separately for each connected component of Γ ,
we determine all entries of z = (z1, . . . , zm) corresponding to issues in J3.
We check that Condition 1 is satisﬁed by working within each connected component C of Γ . Given
any vertex j of C , we apply Lemma 5 repeatedly along a path in Γ from p to j. According to the
initial choice we have xp ∈ F p , and this carries over along the path to yield x j ∈ F j . Hence z j = x j is
not excluded.
Now suppose that Condition 2 is violated for k,  ∈ J3, k = . This means that k,  is matchable but
zk  z . By Condition 1 we have zk ∈ Fk and z ∈ F . Thus k,  satisfy the premises of Lemma 5, and
are therefore joined by an edge in Γ . Hence zk = xk and z = x are compatible, contradicting our
assumption that they are not. 
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